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Adversarial examples represent a great security threat for deep learning
systems, pushing researchers to develop suitable defense mechanisms.
The use of networks adopting error-correcting output codes (ECOC) has
recently been proposed to deal with white-box attacks. In this paper, we
carry out an in-depth investigation of the security achieved by the ECOC
approach. In contrast to previous findings, our analysis reveals that, when
the attack in the white-box framework is carried out properly, the ECOC
scheme can be attacked by introducing a rather small perturbation. We
do so by considering both the popular adversarial attack proposed by
Carlini and Wagner (C&W) and a new variant of C&W attack specifically
designed for multi-label classification architectures, like the ECOC-based
structure. Experimental results regarding different classification tasks
demonstrate that ECOC networks can be successfully attacked by both
the original C&W attack and the new attack.
Introduction: Deep neural networks can solve complicated computer
vision tasks with unprecedented high accuracies. However, they have
been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial examples, namely, properly
crafted inputs introducing small (often imperceptible) perturbations, that
can easily make the networks fail [1, 2, 3]. As a consequence, several
defense mechanisms have been proposed to alleviate this threat [4, 5, 6]
and achieve robustness against adversarial examples. However, when the
attacker is aware of the defense mechanism (white-box scenario), more
powerful attacks can be developed in response to the defense strategy,
thus tipping again the scale in favor of the attacker [7, 8]. In this race
of arms, a novel defence strategy resorting to error-correcting output
coding (ECOC) [11] to improve robustness against adversarial examples,
has recently been proposed in [10]. More specifically, given a general
multi-class classification problem, error-correcting output codes are used
to encode the various classes and represent the network’s outputs.
To explain how, let us refer to the output of the last layer of the
network prior to the final activation layer as logit values or simply logits.
In general, the final activation layer consists of the application of an
activation function, that maps the logits into a prescribed range, and a
normalization layer, that maps the output of the activation functions into
a probability vector, associating a probability value to each class. For
instance, in the common case of one-hot-encoding, a softmax layer is used,
in which case these two steps are performed simultaneously. While with
classifiers based on standard one-hot encoding the attacker can induce and
error by modifying one single logit only [10] (the one associated to the
target class), the final decision of the ECOC classifier depends on multiple
logits in a complicated manner, and hence it is supposedly more difficult
to attack.
By considering the popular white-box C&W attack [9], the results
presented in [10] show that ECOC systems exhibit a significantly lower
attack success rate: for instance, the attack success rate on CIFAR-
10 [12], passes from 100% - for one-hot-encoding - to 29% - for an
ECOC-based classifier. In addition, by looking at the distribution of the
probability assigned to the most probable class for clean (benign) images
and adversarial images, the authors of [10] noticed that, while the model
tends to provide sharp results for clean images, it is often uncertain about
the (incorrect) prediction made on adversarial examples. This behavior
could be exploited to at least distinguish between adversarial examples
and benign inputs.
In this paper, we investigate further the robustness achieved by the
ECOC scheme against adversarial examples and show that, in fact, ECOC
classifiers are vulnerable to adversarial attacks when they are carried out
properly, that is, by fine-tuning the parameters of the attack. Moreover,
by observing that ECOC solves a multi-label classification problem, we
introduce a new white-box attack, inspired to the C&W one, explicitly
thought to work against multi-label classifiers. In fact, the original C&W
is naturally designed to deceive networks adopting the one-hot-encoding
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strategy, and it looses some of its advantages when used against ECOC
systems. The new attack, instead, retains the advantages of the original
C&W attack scheme even in a multi-label classification setup.
We run exhaustive experiments to evaluate the ability of ECOC-based
classifiers to resist a fine-tuned version of C&W attack and the new attack
proposed here. The experiments were carried out by considering two
different tasks, namely Cifar-10 classification and traffic sign classification
(GTSRB)[13], showing that the ECOC classifiers can be successfully
attacked with high success rate by both attacks. In particular, the new
attack can achieve a higher success rates than C&W for the same attack
strength, that is, for the same setting of the parameters of the attack (the
parameters determine the steps and the number of iterations of the attack
in a given step, and hence its computational complexity). Compared to the
classical one-hot-encoding case, attacking the ECOC scheme introduces
a distortion in the image which is just a bit larger (the average PSNR is
1dB or 2dB lower than in the one-hot-encoding case). We also verified
that, by increasing the confidence of the attack, adversarial examples can
achieve high probabilities for the predicted target class, similar to those of
benign samples, hence making it difficult to use the prediction confidence
to detect adversarial samples. Overall, our analysis reveals that the security
gain achieved by the ECOC scheme is a minor one, thus calling for more
powerful defences.
In the rest of the paper, we first briefly review the ECOC scheme
presented in [10], then we describe the proposed attacks. The setup
considered for the experiments and the results we got are reported and
discussed in the Experiments section.
ECOC-based classification: Let us first introduce the notation for a
general multi-class CNN. Let x be the input of the network and y the
class label, k= 1, 2...,M , where M denotes the number of classes. Let
f(x) indicate the decision function of the network. We denote by z=
(z1, z2, ...), the vector with the logit values, that is, as we said, the network
values before the final activations and the mapping to class probabilities.
For one-hot encoding schemes, z has length M and the logits are directly
mapped into probability values through the softmax function ψ as follows:
pψ(k) =ψk(z) =
exp(zk)∑M
i=1 exp(zi)
, (1)
for k= 1, ..,M . Then, the final prediction is made by letting f(x) =
argmaxk pψ(k).
The error-correction-output-coding (ECOC) scheme proposed in [10]
assigns a codeword Ck of length N (N ≥M ) to every output class (k=
1, ...,M ).C denotes theM ×N codeword matrix. Each element ofC can
take values in {−1, 1}. In this way, the length of the logit vector z is N .
The logits are first mapped into the [−1, 1] range by means of an activation
function σ(). Then, the probability of class k computed by looking at the
correlation with Ck, according to the following formula:
pσ(k) =
max(σ(z) ·Ck, 0)∑M
i=1max(σ(z) ·Ci, 0)
(2)
where · denotes the inner product and σ(·) is a sigmoid activation
function applied element-wise to the logits. Since Cij’s take values in
{−1, 1}, the max is necessary to avoid negative probabilities. A sketch
of the ECOC scheme is given in Figure 1. The logits z are first mapped
into correlation values, ρ := σ(z) ·C (mapping step 1), then the vector
with the correlations is normalized so to form a probability distribution
(mapping step 2) via the softmax-like function in (2). The model’s final
predicted label is argmaxk pσ(k). Eq. (2) is a generalization of the
standard softmax activation in eq. (1) and reduces to it for the case of
one-hot encoding, that is when C= IM , with N =M , and where IM is
the identity M ×M matrix.
The purpose of the ECOC-based approach is to design a classifier
which is robust to changes of multiple logits, and then, expectedly,
more difficult to attack (with standard one-hot encoding the adversary
can succeed by altering a single logit). For the scheme to be effective,
codewords characterised by a large minimum Hamming distance must
be chosen. For simplicity, in [10], the ECOC classifier is built by using
Hadamard codes taking values in {−1, 1} (whenC is a Hadamard matrix,
the Hamming distance for large M approaches the limit value N/2).
An advantage with this choice is that, since C is orthogonal, whenever
the network outputs a codeword exactly (that is when σ(z) =Ck), then
pσ(k) = 1. The tanh function is selected as the activation function σ(·).
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Fig. 1. Block diagram of ECOC architecture.
The authors also found that, rather than considering a single network
with N outputs, a classifier consisting of an ensemble of several smaller
networks, each one outputting a few codeword elements, permits to
achieve a larger robustness against attacks. By training separate networks,
in fact, the correlation between errors affecting different bits of the code
is reduced, thus forcing the attacker to attack all of them independently.
In the scheme in Figure 1, every network outputs one codeword element
only, then N ensamble branches are considered.
Attacking ECOC: As baseline attack to assess the security of the ECOC
scheme, we considered the C&W attack [9], due to its popularity
and effectiveness. However, C&W attack is originally designed against
networks adopting the one-hot encoding strategy and, in order to be
applied against a multi-label architecture (like ECOC), it is necessary that
the attack is formalized in a slightly different way, as explained below.
From this formulation, we observe that C&W attack may loose some of
the good properties of the original version when applied against the ECOC
architecture. Then we propose a new version of the attack that turns out to
be more effective than the original one.
We start by observing that C&W attack must be applied immediately
before the softmax (or softmax-like) function. For the one-hot encoding
case this corresponds to applying the attack to the logits[9]. In the ECOC
case, the attack must be applied to the correlation values ρ, rather than to
z. In this way, the optimization problem solved by the attack is
minimize
δ
||δ||2 + λ ·max
i
(max
i 6=t
(ρi(x+ δ))− ρt(x+ δ), c), (3)
where δ is the adversarial additive perturbation, x+ δ is the perturbed
input, and || · ||2 denotes the L2-norm. λ and c are constant parameters
ruling, respectively, the tradeoff between the two terms of the optimization
problem, and the confidence margin of the attack1. Finally, t denotes the
target class corresponding to the codeword Ct, and ρt(z) = σ(z) ·Ct.
A key advantage of C&W attack against one-hot encoding networks is
that it works directly at the logits level. In fact, logits are more sensitive to
modifications of the input than the probability distribution obtained after
the softmax activation2. When C&W attack is applied against ECOC (by
means of (3)), it does not work at the output logit level, but after that
the correlations are computed (mapping step 1), since this is the layer
that precedes the application of the softmax-like function. The correlations
between the activations of the logits and the codewords will likely have
a reduced sensitivity to input modifications, and this may decrease the
effectiveness of the attack.
Based on the above observation, we propose a variant of the C&W
attack which works at the logits level, thus maintaining a good sensitivity
to input modifications. The new variant, can be formulated as follows:
minimize
δ
||δ||2 − λ ·min
i
(2ti · zi(x+ δ), c), (4)
where (t1, t2, · · · , tN ) =Ct is the desired target codeword (ti ∈
{−1, 1}). By solving the above optimization, each logit value zi of the
resulting adversarial image will be highly correlated to ti. Notice that
the attack in (4) is generally applicable to any multi-label classification
network, regardless of the adopted decoding/decision strategy.
Table 1: Results of the attack against ECOC for Cifar-10 classification.
Reported parameters indicate respectively: (start point, number of steps of
binary search, max iterations, confidence).
Proposed (ECOC) C&W (ECOC) C&W (one-hot)
Parameters ASR PSNR ASR PSNR ASR PSNR
(1e-4,5,100,0) 69% 38.19 29% 41.17 90% 39.56
(1e-4,5,500,0) 83% 37.90 41% 42.01 100% 39.56
(1e-4,10,200,0) 87% 37.62 67% 37.86 100% 39.18
(1e-4,10,500,0) 95% 37.59 75% 37.91 100% 39.61
(1e-1,10,2000,0) 99% 38.21 96% 36.24 100% 39.79
Table 2: Results of the attack against ECOC for GTSRB classification.
Reported parameters indicate respectively: (start point, number of steps of
binary search, max iterations, confidence).
Proposed (ECOC) C&W (ECOC) C&W (one-hot)
Parameters ASR PSNR ASR PSNR ASR PSNR
(1e-4,5,100,0) 33% 44.94 7% 50.03 32% 46.96
(1e-4,5,200,0) 40% 44.14 11% 49.78 41% 46.47
(1e-4,5,500,0) 52% 44.35 15% 48.93 54% 46.91
(1e-2,5,500,0) 70% 42.51 22% 46.43 68% 44.09
(1e-1,10,2000,0) 98% 42.86 43% 42.11 86% 44.21
Experiments: In [10], the authors tested the robustness of ECOC scheme
for various combinations of codeword matrices C, activation functions
σ(·) and network structures. The MNIST [14] and Cifar-10 [12]
classification tasks were considered (M = 10 in both cases). In the end, the
best performing system was obtained by considering a Hadamard code
with N = 16 and the tanh activation function. An ensemble of 4 (N/4)
networks each one outputting 4 bits was considered. The authors argue
that using a large number of ensembles increases the performance of the
system against attacks (by decreasing the dependency among output bits).
Then, in our experiments, we used N ensembles, with only one output
bit each. A diagram of the ECOC scheme with the N ensemble structure
is shown in Figure 1. We used a standard VGG-16 network [15] as the
base block of our implementation. Following the ECOC design scheme,
the first 6 layers form the so called ’shared bottom’ part, that is, the
layers shared by all the networks of the ensamble. Then, the remaining
10 layers (the last 8 convolutional layers and the 2 fully connected layers)
are trained separately for each ensemble branch. In our experiments,
we considered the Cifar-10 classification task, with the same setup used
in [10]. We also considered the traffic sign classification task (GTSRB
database) [13], to test the robustness of ECOC on a different number of
classes and a different size of the codewords. To be specific, for traffic
sign classification, we set M = 32, by selecting the classes with more
examples among the total number of 44 classes in GTSRB, and chose a
Hadamard code with N =M = 32. For each task, we first trained one M -
class classification network, then we fine-tuned the weights to get the N
ensemble networks. The error rates of the trained models on clean images
1 In fact, in [9], we have δ = 1/2 tanh(w) + 1 and the minimization is carried out
over w.
2 Most adversarial attacks work directly on the probability values obtained after the
softmax, which makes them less effective than C&W, and prone to gradient-vanishing
problems.
2
Table 3: Probability values output by the ECOC classifier on Cifar-10 for different confidence margins of the attack. The parameters of the attacks are
indicated according to the following format: (starting point, number of steps of binary search, max iterations, confidence). Prob true and target class
indicate the probabilities of the original (true) and target classes, before (B) and after (A) the attack.
C&W attack (1e-4,5,500,0) (1e-4,5,500,8) (1e-4,5,500,12) (1e-4,5,500,14) (1e-4,5,500,15)
ASR 41% 39% 39% 39/% 38%
PSNR 42.01 40.10 39.38 38.73 38.42
Prob. true class (B) 0.934 (A) 0.293 (B) 0.935 (A) 0.157 (B) 0.935 (A) 0.085 (B) 0.935 (A) 0.046 (B) 0.934 (A) 0.022
Prob. target class (B) 0.007 (A) 0.296 (B) 0.008 (A) 0.536 (B) 0.008 (A) 0.719 (B) 0.008 (A) 0.848 (B) 0.008 -(A) 0.919
Proposed attack (1e-4,5,500,0) (1e-4,5,500,1.0) (1e-4,5,500,1.5) (1e-4,5,500,2.0) (1e-4,5,500,2.5)
ASR 83% 82% 82% 82% 81%
PSNR 37.90 37.39 37.07 36.81 36.62
Prob. true class (B) 0.965 (A) 0.193 (B) 0.965 (A) 0.103 (B) 0.965 (A) 0.068 (B) 0.968 (A) 0.043 (B) 0.964 (A) 0.028
Prob. target class (B) 0.004 (A) 0.565 (B) 0.004 (A) 0.754 (B) 0.004 (A) 0.831 (B) 0.004 (A) 0.886 (B) 0.004 (A) 0.926
are equal to 13.9% for Cifar-10 and 1.28% for traffic sign (GTSRB)
classification.
To solve the attacks formalized in eq. (3) and (4), we used the
same optimization procedure adopted in [9], by resorting to a binary
search to optimize λ, and by performing, for each binary search step,
a certain number of gradient descent iterations to build the adversarial
image. Finally, we select the adversarial image leading to the minimum
distortion. The attack procedure is characterized by four input parameters:
the starting point of the binary search, the number of steps of the binary
search, the maximum number of iterations for every binary search, and
the value of the constant c. For a fair comparison between the two tested
attacks, the same input parameters are considered for both of them (with
the exception of the value of the confidence margin c, that, as it is evident
from the equations describing the attacks, refers to different quantities in
the two cases).
We applied C&W and the new attack to 100 images randomly chosen
from the test set of each task. The target class of the attack was chosen
at random among the remaining M − 1 classes (i.e., all the M classes
except the original class of the unperturbed image). The label t of the
target class was used to run the C&W attack in eq. (3), while the codeword
Ct associated to t is considered in (4) for the new attack.
For both tasks, we run the C&W and the new attack with several
settings of the input parameters. The results we got, in terms of Attack
Success Rate (ASR) and PSNR (averaged on the successfully attacked
images only), are shown in Table 1 and 2, for the Cifar-10 and traffic
sign classification respectively. In all the cases, c was set to 0. The results
obtained by using the C&W attack against the standard one-hot encoding
VGG-16 network with M classes are also reported in the last column.
When the parameters are modified to increase the strength of the attack,
e.g. by using a larger number of iterations or a larger number of steps
during the binary search, C&W attack can easily increase the ASR, at the
price of a slightly larger distortion. For instance, for Cifar-10, the ASR of
C&W attack increases from 29%, with the setting (1e-4,5,100,0), to 96%,
with the setting (1e-1,10,2000,0), with a decrease in the PSNR of only
5 db. From the tables, we also see that, for the same parameter setting,
the ASR of the new attack variant is higher than that obtain by C&W.
For example, for the Cifar-10 case with setting (1e-4,10,500,0), the ASR
is 75% for C&W and 95% for the proposed attack, with a gain of 20%
for a virtually identical PSNR (37.9 and 37.6 respectively). Comparing
Table 1 and 2, we see that attacking GTSRB requires a larger effort to
get a similar ASR. This can be explained by the fact that in the GTSRB
case the length of the codewords is significantly larger (actually double)
than in the other case. However, our experiments show that, by using the
new variant of the attack it is still possible to attack ECOC system (with
N = 32) with an ASR = 98% and introducing a low distortion. Hence, the
advantage of using longer codeword seems quite limited. Altogether, our
analysis reveals that, in the white-box scenario, the security gain that can
be achieved through the ECOC scheme is a minor one.
Another expected advantage of ECOC is that adversarial examples tend
to be classified with a lower probability than clean images. Here we show
that such a behaviour can be inhibited - at the price of a minor PNSR loss
- by increasing the confidence of the attack. If a larger confidence margin
c is used, in fact, the model becomes more certain about the wrongly
predicted class. To back such a claim, in Table 3 we report the results
of the attacks for different confidence values c for the Cifar-10 case. The
table shows the average probability assigned by the ECOC model to the
original class (Prob true class) and to the target class of the attack (Prob
targ class), before and after the attack. From this table, we see that, by
increasing c, the adversarial examples have higher probabilities for the
target class predicted by the model, similar to those of the benign samples.
In particular, by focusing on the C&W attack, the average probability for
the target class passes from 0.296 (with c= 0) to 0.919 (with c= 15),
while the probability of the original (true) class decreases from 0.293 (with
c= 0) to a value lower than 0.003 (with c= 15). A similar behavior can be
observed for the new attack when c is raised from 0 to 2.53. The table also
shows that for the image attacked with the largest confidence margins the
reduction of the PSNR due to the increased strength of the attack is very
small (4dB for C&W and about 1dB for the proposed attack).
As a last observation, upon inspection of Tables 1 and 2, we observe
that, for both tasks, in order to attack the ECOC scheme with the new
attack proposed in this paper, the attacker must introduce a distortion
which is only slightly larger than that necessary to attack the one-hot
encoding classifier (the PSNR in the ECOC case is only about 1dB
larger for Cifar-10, and about 2 dB larger for GTSRB). For instance, for
the Cifar-10, the C&W attack carried out against the one-hot encoding
classifier reaches an ASR = 100% with a PSNR of 39.8 with the setting
(1e− 4, 10, 100, 0), while the proposed attack can attack the ECOC
scheme with an ASR= 99% and a PSNR of 38.2 for the same setting.
These results confirm that when the knowledge of the system is properly
exploited by the attacker, no significant gain of robustness can be achieved
by the ECOC scheme.
Conclusion: We have shown that the use of error correction to code
the output of a CNN classifier (as proposed in [10]) does not increase
significantly the robustness against adversarial examples. In fact the
ECOC scheme can be induced to make a wrong decision by introducing
a small perturbation into the image, both with the standard C&W attack
applied with a proper parameter setting, and with a new variant of the
attack, specifically designed for multi-class classification.
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